

WAR ?

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**the
SUPERPOWERS
the
THREAT OF WAR &
the
BRITISH WORKING CLASS**

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SECOND WORLD DEFENCE

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The Soviet Union : An Imperialist Great Power

Ever since 1945, the principal victors of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union, have maintained a state of mutual confrontation. The rivalry between them now extends across the whole surface of the globe; but it is in Europe in particular, where the Soviet and the American spheres of influence directly face one another, that the confrontation has been constant and tense. The danger of a new world war is not a new idea; it has been with us for the full thirty years that has passed since the end of the last. What, then, is there new to say about it, or about the way that the British working class should respond to the war danger? And with the increased talk of 'détente', and bilateral agreements of various kinds between the two superpowers, is the danger of war not on the decline, rather than on the rise?

We believe that there is something new to say. The appearance of 'détente' can easily conceal and camouflage a reality that is very different, and the roles of the two superpowers themselves are in no way static and unchanging. The Soviet Union, in particular, has gone through major changes in the past thirty years, but as often happens, awareness of these generally lags a good way behind the event.

THE BASIS OF SOVIET PRESTIGE

At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union enjoyed enormous prestige among the working classes of Europe. It was the USSR, and not Britain and America, who had borne the main burden in defeating fascism, at an immense sacrifice in human life. The prestige was such that in February 1949, when the Cold War was already in full swing, Maurice Thorez, general secretary of the French Communist Party, the mass party of the French working class, could speak hypothetically of the welcome that the French people would give the Soviet Army were it to 'liberate' France in the course of an American-inspired anti-Soviet war.

This unquestioning loyalty of the Western Communist Parties was only possible because of a groundswell of pro-Soviet sentiment in the working class that went far beyond the CPs themselves—most noticeably in countries like Britain, where the CP was always small. If it is generally acknowledged today that the Cold War was an offensive from

the American side, which hoped to use its possession of the atom bomb to revise the Yalta agreements and 'roll back' the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, this was already clear at the time to all honest representatives of the working class. In Britain, for example, Aneurin Bevan countered the American charge that the Soviet Union sought to overrun Western Europe with the basic figures of steel production in the two camps. How could the Soviet Union, with a steel production of 30 million tons per year, conceive of a war of aggression against an alliance producing 140 million tons?

Support for the Soviet Union's international position was paralleled by respect for its social system. For the Western CPs in the immediate post-war period, the Soviet Union and the 'People's Democracies' of Eastern Europe provided a model that they sought to emulate. And outside the ranks of the CPs, too, the advances made by the Russian working class were admired even by many socialists who had criticisms of 'Stalinism' and its repressive aspects. It seemed that the heroic struggle of the Soviet Union against fascism, and its struggle for peace in the post-war period, emanated from the basic fact that in the Soviet Union, unlike in the West, the working class was in command.

CONFUSION ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION

It was not the barrage of Cold War propaganda that weakened the favourable public opinion the Soviet Union enjoyed in the workers' movements of Western Europe. When Stalin died on 5th March 1953, many millions of workers in the West still felt his death as the death of *their* leader. What has caused this pro-Soviet opinion to ebb is the condition of the Soviet Union itself, and the foreign policy to which this gives rise.

In the 1940s and 50s, the pace of Soviet industrial development, and the high level of social services provided for its people even in the midst of post-war reconstruction, was still a powerful magnet attracting working-class sympathy. The repressive aspect of the Soviet state, and the lack of political freedom as understood by the working class in the West, could be seen as a temporary drawback, even one made necessary by the pressures of imperialist encirclement and the threat of invasion. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union cannot present the same face to the Western working classes. Its progress in certain fields of heavy industry remains relatively high, but in producing consumer goods it lags as far behind the West as before. In agriculture, it is still incapable of feeding itself adequately and has to import grain from the West, despite the employment of 45 per cent of its population on the land. In social services, the gains won by the working class in the West have substantially narrowed the Soviet lead. But even more important, after thirty years of peace, the Soviet working class is still denied proper access to information on current affairs, and the opportunity to study for itself the clash of ideologies taking place in the world, let alone the rights of freedom

of press, association and assembly that have been so important to the workers' movement in all countries.

In foreign policy, the action that has made the strongest impression on the West European working classes is the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Precisely because this was directed against a 'fraternal' Communist Party and the government it led, none of the pretexts that were used at the time of the intervention in Hungary in 1956 held any water. The Czechoslovak invasion was blatantly an intervention *against* the working people of that country, to prevent them from determining their own form of society. As such, it threw into sharp perspective both the Soviet leaders' attitude towards their own working class, and their concept of an international 'socialist community'.

Since the mid-sixties, there has been a new upsurge of working-class struggle in Western Europe. Even where this has not taken the spectacular form that it did in France in May 1968, it has still been far-reaching; particularly at the level of social relations in the factory, and the all-round attacks on the 'managerial prerogative'. But precisely in this period, the CPs in Western Europe have had to make clear to their respective working classes that the model of socialism for which they stand is *not* the Soviet model, that for them socialism is inconceivable without democracy, etc. For the new left-wing groups outside the CPs, or the revitalized left wings of the Social-Democratic parties, this is taken for granted anyway. If it was simply up to the working class of each country to struggle for socialism in its own way, then the Soviet Union would no doubt become gradually more irrelevant.

But in the world of imperialism, it is simply impossible for the working class of any country to struggle for socialism in isolation. Our world is riven by international conflicts, between oppressor and oppressed nations, but also between rival imperialisms contending with one another over the actual or potential spoils of the imperialist economy, and these conflicts periodically break out into open and cataclysmic world war. In its strategy and tactics, the workers' movement of every country has to take into account where that country is situated in the imperialist 'chain', otherwise it simply 'bows to spontaneity' and is taken in tow by the foreign policy of the bourgeoisie. In 1864, Marx already wrote in his *Inaugural Address* for the First International that events had 'taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics', and the necessity of struggling for their own foreign policy. This is still more true in the imperialist era. But this means today that the British working class, and the workers of Western Europe in general, must have a clear understanding of such dominant phenomena of world politics as the contention between the Soviet Union and the United States, something that is not easy to achieve, and is all too often impeded by the mists of past sentiment. Loyalty to the Soviet Union in foreign affairs still lingers on, even among parties and groups who are quite independent of the Soviet Union in their own domestic policies.

We believe that the present conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is quite unambiguously an inter-imperialist conflict, and

not a conflict between capitalism and socialism. This assertion is bound to raise several objections, and we shall try and deal with these honestly as we explain what we mean.

IS THE SOVIET UNION CAPITALIST?

It is often said that the Soviet Union is not a capitalist country, and therefore cannot be imperialist. There is no denying that ownership of all major means of production in the Soviet Union is vested in the hands of the state, or—in the case of the collective farms—subordinated administratively to the state sector. And though the economic reforms in the Soviet Union have relaxed the very rigid central control over state-owned enterprises, the situation in the Soviet Union today is not one in which these enterprises function as genuinely independent capitals in a market economy. In this respect, the Soviet Union is clearly distinct from the Western capitalist economies, although the gap seems to be narrowing in the long run, as the state sector comes to predominate in the West as well. But the 'anarchy of production' of the classical capitalism analysed by Marx, the relationship of capitalist competition, is only part of capitalism, and not the most important part at that, particularly from the standpoint of the working class. Engels already wrote in 1877 that, as capitalism develops, 'the official representative of capitalist society—the state—will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production'; but 'the more it [the state] proceeds to the taking over of the productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit'. 'The workers', in such a case, 'remain wage-workers—proletarians' (*Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*). The crucial question for the working class, in looking at a society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state, is 'who controls the state?'

It is significant that there is still more disagreement about the internal character of the Soviet Union than there is about Soviet foreign policy. This is not just because it is more difficult to assemble hard information about social relations within the Soviet Union, whereas foreign trade and monetary flows, military movements and radio broadcasts are more easily measurable. Most of the disagreement as to whether the Soviet Union is 'a socialist state with Stalinist residues', 'a deformed workers' state', or simply 'state capitalist', are not so much disagreements about the immediate facts of Soviet society as about how this present condition is located on its historical trajectory. For critics of 'Stalinism' in the Western CPs or the Labour and Social-Democratic parties, the Soviet working class can get back onto the right track through a process of reform, basically initiated by a section of the Party leadership (after the manner of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia); for the Trotskyists, the Soviet workers have to make a 'political revolution' against the 'bureaucracy'; for the International Socialists, the Soviet workers' revolution is a 'social' one and not just 'political'. But what all these different tendencies agree

is that the present political leadership in the Soviet Union does not promote the interests of the Soviet working class, but deploys the state-socialized productive forces and the repressive and ideological state apparatuses so as to perpetuate a division between the workers and the privileged elite.

In the Marxist sense, any such elite whose position is based on the organization of production is a *class*. 'Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy' (Lenin, 'A Great Beginning' [1919], *Collected Works*, vol. 29, p. 421). Note that the relation to the means of production does not necessarily have to be 'fixed and formulated in law'. Following Engels' use of the term (see above), we maintain that a society in which capitalist competition has been basically done away with, but not exploitation, should still be called 'capitalist'.

TWO CAPITALIST SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Soviet and Western propaganda both agree that the social systems in East and West are substantially different, as in several respects they obviously are. But in the Soviet bloc as in the Western countries the social relations that are reproduced involve a class division between the workers, who have no effective control over the productive process, and a class that controls the means of production and thereby maintains a privileged position at the workers' expense. Once it is understood that both social systems are against the interest of the working class, the question arises whether there is anything in one kind of capitalism or the other that makes either the Soviet or the Western system significantly worse.

In the Soviet Union and the countries under its sway, economic production is controlled by the state to a substantially greater extent than in the West; though in the long run this gap is being narrowed by the development of Western capitalism itself towards a state capitalist system. Taken by itself, this is a definite advance over the 'anarchy' of the market. But state control in itself only provides certain 'technical conditions' for the control by society as a whole of the productive forces, as Engels put it, and thus for the liberation of the working class—it is not the solution of the conflict' (loc. cit.). This aspect in which Soviet society is more advanced than the West has to be judged against other aspects of vital interest to the working class.

It is in certain countries of the Third World, where the dominant need

facing the people is the all-round development of the economy, that the Soviet model exerts its strongest attraction. Here, tight state control over production, in industry at least, and a state monopoly of foreign trade, is essential for economic development. Although in the optimal case this is carried out, as in China, under the leadership of a Communist Party with a genuine 'mass line' (which can only grow out of a thorough-going people's revolution), it may well be worth the price of a backward country paying the price of some of the negative aspects of the Soviet model, if need be, for the sake of the benefits it brings. This is particularly the case if the alternative is to languish in the 'under-developed' role allotted by the free play of the world market. Experience shows, however, that the ability of a Third World country today to make use of a Soviet-type system for the purpose of all-round economic development precisely depends on its preserving its independence from the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union actually seeks to maintain the 'international division of labour' that is the basis of imperialist exploitation. (See below.)

In the European situation, moreover, this relatively favourable aspect that the Soviet model displays does not have the same significance. The main problem facing the European workers is not the need for economic development to break the chains of imperialist exploitation. The main claim of the Soviet system to superiority over the West, and even to 'socialism', i.e. its centrally planned economy, is far less important for the workers of a country that is already industrially developed and where the productive forces are themselves already pushing forward the development of state ownership and planning. It is outweighed absolutely by the 'backward' and regressive features that the Soviet Union displays in contrast with the Western bourgeois democracies. In these countries, but not in the Soviet bloc, the working class is able to form genuine organizations of class struggle (independent trade unions and political parties), to receive information and ideas from the whole spread of contemporary sources, to conduct free debate and formulate its requirements as a rising class, and engage in open political struggle for these requirements. In the Soviet-bloc countries, where the CP machine which monopolizes political power has become quite divorced from the workers and is controlled by a privileged class, the working class do not have this ability, and yet this is the fundamental need for the workers' movement in any industrialized country.

For any class-conscious worker who has had the opportunity to make a study of the conditions of the working class in Western and Eastern Europe, there can be no doubt that it is the position of the working class in the West that is on balance more 'advanced', and that the decisive factor here is that of political freedom, i.e. of bourgeois democracy as opposed to what is generally called fascism. The incorporation of West Germany, or Italy, or Britain in the Soviet 'socialist community' would not be a victory for the working class of these countries, but a major defeat, even if this question could be posed independently of the role of the two superpowers in Europe—the USA and the USSR.

SOVIET ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

In theory, even a genuine workers' state could practise imperialism towards other countries. Such a situation might conceivably have arisen if the working class had seized power first of all in the metropolitan countries, as Marx originally believed they would. For the workers of these countries not to take advantage of their dominant position in the world economy to exploit the more backward countries, a very strong ideological commitment would be necessary (based of course on an awareness by the metropolitan working classes themselves of their own long-term interests). But if the state in a big and powerful country controls the economy, but is itself controlled by a privileged class of experts, managers and bureaucrats concerned to perpetuate their own position of superiority over the workers, then there is obviously no such ideological barrier to that state making use of its position to exploit the peoples of other countries.

Countries with a 'planned economy' can thus practise imperialism just as much as those which still have a large private sector. And if a 'socialist' state in the Soviet sense has sufficient resources, there is similarly nothing to stop it developing into one of the imperialist 'great powers', wedding economic exploitation to the military-political oppression of other countries and contending with rival imperialist great powers for the redivision of the world.

As the Soviet Union's economic relations with other countries have developed in the past two decades, it has come to exhibit all the fundamental forms of imperialist exploitation, i.e. the extraction of surplus-value from the working people of other countries, that were pioneered by Western imperialism.

a) Export of finance capital. Lenin maintained in his book *Imperialism* that foreign loans were the typical form of capital export, and that capital export was the fundamental feature differentiating international economic relations in the imperialist era from the pre-imperialist phase, characterized by the export of goods alone. Today the greater part of Western finance capital exports take the form of 'aid', i.e. loans to Third World governments by governments of the capitalist metropolises or their inter-governmental agencies (World Bank, IMF, etc.). What enables the capitalist metropolises to label this exploitation 'aid' is simply that the terms on which it is granted are somewhat lower than the most extortionate that the market would bear, in return for political considerations. Soviet 'aid' precisely fits this pattern. As with all such 'aid', the terms are affected to a greater or lesser extent by the political dimension (competition for spheres of influence, bribery of local ruling classes, etc.), but the interest charged on Soviet 'aid' today is actually higher on average than that charged by the Western countries. The indebtedness of recipient countries to the Soviet Union is increasingly great. Half of Egypt's foreign debt, for instance, is to the Soviet Union. India, which is still borrowing heavily from the Soviet Union, is paying back in interest each year a sum one-fourth as much again. As with all imperial-

ist 'aid', various strings are attached that vitiate ostensibly favourable terms. Countries receiving Soviet 'aid', for instance, are frequently obliged to buy unmoded and unusable Soviet equipment at high prices, and high salaries and allowances are subtracted for the large number of Soviet 'specialists' and 'advisers' administering the 'aid'. (Military 'aid' is also used as a means of economic exploitation. Soviet arms are sold to Third World countries at high prices, and often only for hard currency.)

b) Export of industrial capital. The form this has so far taken is that of joint-stock enterprises with foreign governments, the Soviet state thereby directly purchasing the labour-power of foreign workers to draw a profit. This form was originally developed for use in the countries under direct Soviet political control (Eastern Europe and Mongolia; also attempted in China in the first few years after 1949), but as its industrial strength increased, the Soviet Union has come to apply the joint-stock principle in the Third World also. The Soviet journal *Kommunist* asserted that this is the 'new form of cooperation' which has 'more and more resolutely' been given priority in 'perfecting even more the international division of labour'. India, again, has the largest portion of these joint-stock enterprises, through which the Soviet Union now controls the greater part of India's heavy industry.

c) Unequal exchange. It has become increasingly well-known that the imperialist world market involves the exchange of smaller quantities of labour in the form of industrial manufactures against larger quantities of labour in the form of primary products. The Soviet Union has set out to exploit and perpetuate this international division of labour. Kosygin proclaimed this intention back in 1966: 'This co-operation enables the Soviet Union to make better use of the international division of labour. We shall be able to purchase in these countries increasing quantities of their traditional export commodities—cotton, wool, skins and hides, dressed non-ferrous ores, vegetable oil, fruit, coffee, cocoa beans, tea and other raw materials and a variety of manufactured goods' (Report to the 23rd Congress, CPSU: 5th April 1966). It is notorious in many Third World countries that the Soviet exports received in exchange are often inferior in quality, and even more expensive in price, than equivalent Western exports.

d) Commodity speculation. The Soviet state, purchasing and selling in the world market on a vast scale, is able to use this economic leverage to extract a surplus-profit on its 'merchant's capital'. A recent example of this is the sale to Western Europe of natural gas originally supplied to the Soviet Union by Iran at a far lower price.

In strictly economic terms, then, Soviet goods and money function as capital in the world economy just as do Western exports, as means for pumping surplus-value out of the working people of the more backward countries and channelling this into the Soviet economy. Whatever the specific features that distinguish Soviet economic organization, these are not features that prevent the Soviet Union from practising an imperial-

ism which is economically the same as that practised by the West.

They do however give the Soviet Union the opportunity for a further form of international exploitation not at present open to the West. In those countries directly controlled by the Soviet Union politically (its 'back garden' in Eastern Europe and Mongolia), the 'economic integration' of CMEA ('Comecon') provides for an international central planning to the advantage of the Soviet overlord. A particularly notorious example of this was when the Soviet Union took advantage of the rise in oil prices won by OPEC, in 1974, to double the price at which it had undertaken to provide oil (produced in the Soviet Union) to its CMEA 'partners'. But the general state of affairs prevailing in CMEA has now given rise to an endemic, if so far muted, struggle against Soviet exploitation.

WESTERN AND SOVIET IMPERIALISM: THE SAME DRIVING FORCE

Finally on the economic basis of Soviet imperialism, it is sometimes said that while the Western countries are driven to imperialism by the internal contradictions of the market economy (falling rate of profit, realization problem), this is not the case with the Soviet Union, which therefore 'does not need' to be imperialist in the sense that the West does.

This distinction is merely a surface appearance, generated by the fact that in the Soviet Union all decisions regarding foreign trade and investment are made by the state, and thus seem to have more of a 'political' and 'voluntary' character than they do in the case of private corporations. The motive for capital export in a market economy, however, is not an absolute necessity, but simply that a higher rate of return is to be found abroad. 'If capital is sent abroad, this is not done because it absolutely could not be applied at home, but because it can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country' (Marx, *Capital III*, p. 251). It is only Rosa Luxemburg, and not Marx or Lenin, who held—wrongly, as is generally admitted today—that capital exports are needed for the very reproduction of capital in the metropolitan economy. *The only 'need' for capital export in the Western case, as in the Soviet, is the greed of those who benefit from it.*

As far as the international division of labour between industrial countries and primary producers is concerned, the drive for raw materials has still more evidently the same roots in the Soviet case as in the Western. There is no mystical 'necessity' about Western capitalism generating imperialism that is absent from the Soviet case because of its planned economy. As Lenin put it: 'The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the

world, the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies' (*Imperialism*, ch. vi). And the exchange of unequal values that this involves similarly does not depend on any mechanism unique to the Western capitalist countries, but simply on the world market.

THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF IMPERIALISM

It is easy to argue that Soviet foreign policy, for all its negative features, cannot be understood simply in terms of economic imperialism. This is quite true, but so is it true for all imperialist powers. Returning to Lenin's *Imperialism*: 'An essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e. for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine *his* hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against England; England needs Baghdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.' (ch. vii). It is only in such strategic terms, and not simply in terms of a profit-and-loss economic calculation, that the American war in Indochina, for example, can be understood, and it is in the same terms that one can and must make sense of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Threat of a New World War

EUROPE AS THE FOCUS OF CONTENTION

After the break between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviets began to build up forces along their Chinese frontier, and in 1969 they provoked minor border incidents and also threatened much more serious action. But while the Chinese take very seriously the Soviet threat, and have undertaken elaborate precautionary measures to meet it, they themselves point out that the Soviet Union is at the moment 'making a feint in the East to attack in the West'. The Soviet forces facing China at the present time are not sufficient to mount a conventional attack. Three-quarters of Soviet land and air forces remain directed toward the West, and the mutual confrontation between the two blocs that arose shortly after the common victory over Nazi Germany remains today the primary strategic concern for both the Soviet Union and the USA, as well as dominating the politics of Europe itself.

There are certainly economic reasons why Europe is so highly valued by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Western Europe, especially, forms one of the greatest concentrations of skilled labour, technical knowledge and productive capacity in the world, and access to these resources is highly desirable for both superpowers. Today there is also the important factor of the North Sea oil and gas discoveries, at which the Soviet Union only too clearly casts a greedy eye. However, the Soviet-US contention in Europe, as elsewhere, can only be understood by taking the strategic dimension equally into account.

Ever since 1945, there has been a fundamental asymmetry between the role of the USA in the West of Europe and that of the Soviet Union in the East. The USA emerged from the Second World War overwhelmingly predominant in the world economy, possessing slightly over half of the world's industrial capacity in its own home territory. In the part of Europe it liberated, as also in Britain, it found a social system fundamentally like its own (private monopoly capitalism/bourgeois democracy), which was gravely weakened by war, but could be put back on its feet by injection of US dollars rather than bayonets. (Even in Italy and France, the CPs did not give the Anglo-American liberators too much trouble.) The economic dependence of West European capitalism on the United States allowed massive export of US capital, leading to a consequent flow of surplus-value westward across the Atlantic, but the United States never had to contemplate using military force against the peoples

of Western Europe to maintain the status quo. Its position vis-à-vis the European bourgeoisie was that of 'first among equals', and the NATO alliance, in particular, never gave the US any direct peacetime command over European forces. The greater wealth of the West European economies, once they were rebuilt with US support (the Marshall plan), also exerted a constant subverting effect on the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

The role of the SU in Europe has been fundamentally different. Suffering the most terrible invasion from Nazi Germany, it bore the main brunt of the anti-fascist war in Europe and defeated the aggressors at an immense cost in human life and resources. The Soviet Union could not appear in the countries it liberated as a wealthy benefactor, and yet it was determined that there would be no new imperialist attack from the West. The road it chose to ensure this was to forestall US penetration of Eastern Europe with the so-called 'iron curtain', making it clear that the United States would not be able to use its economic power to gain influence in the sphere allotted to the Soviet Union by the Yalta agreement. The US response to this, of course, was to try and reverse the Yalta partition and use the nuclear threat to 'roll back' the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, though it flinched from the all-out war that would have been necessary to achieve this end.

The concern of the Soviet Union to create a reliable buffer zone between itself and US imperialism was understandable. But the choice that was made, whatever the reasons behind it, meant not relying on the peoples newly liberated from fascism and their common interest with the Soviet Union in rejecting US imperialism and a new war, but relying instead on the military supremacy of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe to maintain a sphere of influence, even at the cost of provoking major anti-Soviet sentiment among its 100 million people.

The flagrant great-power chauvinism that the Soviet Union exhibited in Eastern Europe, forcibly transforming the social systems of the countries under its sway after its own model, quite irrespective of the interest or sentiment of the working class in those countries, both says something about the nature of Soviet society and state at this time, and already provided a constituent element of the pattern of social-imperialism ('socialism in words, imperialism in deeds': Lenin) that was to take full shape in the 1960s. And because the Soviet Union could only transform Eastern Europe to its desired social condition by forcible means, it has ever since played a completely different role vis-à-vis the European people than that of the USA.

In Western Europe, the economic revival of the 1950s and 1960s, the formation and extension of the EEC and the relative decline in the economic supremacy of the USA, has weakened American control of the West European countries, which was exerted from the beginning by economic means. The American burden that Western Europe has to bear can in no way be compared with the burden inflicted by US imperialism on the South American countries, for example, whose econ-

omies it fetters, or develops in grotesquely one-sided ways, while enforcing its rule through military juntas that it trains and bribes. In Europe, it is the Soviet burden that is heavy, while the American burden is relatively light, and far easier to remove altogether. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union only maintains regimes allied to its own by sheer military force. In four cases, it has had to send tanks against the people of these supposedly independent countries to prevent them from changing their governments. The same asymmetry applies to any prospective expansion by either of the superpowers of their spheres of influence in Europe. The USA would certainly like to see Eastern Europe 'opened up' to American capital, and undertakes various kinds of subversion in support of anti-Soviet tendencies in the various East European countries that might be favourable to a rapprochement with the Western camp (though with far less vigour now than it did in the 1950s). The Soviet Union, however, has far less opportunity for 'peaceful' expansion to the West, at least so long as the Atlantic Alliance remains united. Already dependent on its military force to hold down Eastern Europe, it would have to expand further in the same terms.

IS SOVIET STRATEGY DEFENSIVE?

It is one of the tragic ironies of history that, out of considerations that were originally defensive against the then dominant imperialism, the Soviet Union built up an empire in Europe that was far more brutal than that of its rival. And the inhibitions that were broken down when Eastern Europe was annexed led on to the Soviet Union's later adventures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Africa and elsewhere. Once a country embarks on a policy of oppressing other nations in the interests of its own defence, it is already on the slippery slope towards oppressing other nations as a way of life.

Until the late 1950s, at least, Soviet strategy was essentially defensive. In military terms, the Soviet Union provided itself, as China does today, with a range of weaponry sufficient to ensure its effective defence against nuclear or conventional attack. But a country that has no intention of embarking on a war of aggression, or of being the first to use nuclear weapons, has no need to compete in the scale of its armaments with the leading imperialist great power, and the Soviet Union did not do so. As the Soviet Union grew economically stronger, however, it developed higher aspirations. Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed these as follows: 'The Soviet Union, which, as a major world power, has extensive international contacts, cannot regard passively events that, though they might be territorially remote, nevertheless have a bearing on our security and the security of our friends' (Session of the Supreme Soviet, 10th July 1969). Change 'Soviet Union' to 'United States', and the language is almost impossible to distinguish from the rhetoric used by the US imperialists in their own claim to world hegemony.

The Soviet Union's definition of itself as a great power has come to be formalized in the so-called 'Brezhnev doctrine', which essentially consists of five elements: the theory of 'limited sovereignty', the theory of the 'international dictatorship of the proletariat', the theory of the 'socialist community', the theory of the 'international division of labour', and the theory that 'our interests are involved'. While the first three of these elements serve particularly to justify the maintenance of Soviet hegemony over its traditional satellites, invasions such as that of Czechoslovakia and economic exploitation through CMEA, the theory of the 'international division of labour' also legitimates the economic annexation of Third World countries, discussed above, while under the theory that 'our interests are involved', the Soviet rulers seek to obtain a free hand for expanding their sphere of influence in any direction, as intimated in the above quotation from Gromyko.

Particularly since Brezhnev took office in 1964, Soviet military spending has followed a sharply upward curve. Today, the Soviet Union spends almost twice as great a proportion of its Gross National Product on 'defence' as the USA (10.6% against 6.1% in 1974, according to *The Military Balance 1975-76*, International Institute for Strategic Studies). The real differential in military effort is far greater, taking into account that a far higher proportion of US expenditure goes in pay to what is now an all-volunteer force. In the twelve years from 1963 to 1975, the Soviet Union has increased its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles from 100 in number to 1618, against a United States increase from 294 to 1054, and its Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles from 100 to 784, against a United States increase from 224 to 636. While US military manpower has declined from 2,699,000 in 1971 to 2,130,000 in 1975, Soviet manpower has increased from 3,375,000 to 3,575,000. Soviet reservists, moreover, number a further 5,700,000, as against 926,000 in the case of the USA. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet defence was quite adequate to deter any Western invasion, at a time when the West was also far stronger economically vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than it is today. But since the 'thaw' in relations with the USA, and still more so since the current 'détente' began, the Soviet Union has stepped up its armaments programme on the vast scale indicated above, even at the price of failing to meet its Ninth Five-year Plan (1971-75)—particularly in the field of consumer goods.

The sphere of Soviet armaments that is most telling of Soviet intentions is that of sea power, since the Soviet economy is far less dependent on maritime transport than that of the West, and would be far less imperilled by naval blockade. Yet it is here in particular that Soviet efforts have been most pronounced. In the Mediterranean the Soviet Union has built up an equivalent counterforce to the US Sixth Fleet, and is doing the same in the Indian Ocean. In his speech on Soviet Navy Day in 1969, S. G. Gorshkov, the naval Commander-in-Chief, expressed Soviet intentions in the following words: 'Ships of the Soviet Navy' would 'sail... wherever it is required by the interests of our country's security'. Six years later, after a mammoth programme of naval

expansion, Defence Minister Grechko was able to boast, in May 1975, that Soviet warships had now 'sailed beyond the coastal waters and inland seas into the vast oceans of the world'. The leading role in Soviet naval construction now falls to attack and missile carrying submarines, and the Soviet Northern Fleet has also been greatly augmented, with its forward defence perimeter advanced to the Greenland/Iceland/Faroes line. On the northern flank of Europe as well as the southern, Soviet strategy is steadily shifting to an offensive stance, and the same is also true with Soviet air forces in Europe, which have been changing their emphasis from air defence to offensive operations.

Diplomatically, the Soviet Union has succeeded in having itself recognized by the US as a power with strategic parity to itself, with 'interests' everywhere, and the means to promote them. And as the Soviet Union has drawn level with the US in this way, it has not hesitated to throw its new-found weight around in the world arena. The Soviet Union might like people to believe that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was no more than a policing operation in its back garden, under the signboards of 'limited sovereignty' in the 'socialist community', and the 'international dictatorship of the proletariat'. But already in 1969, as has been disclosed in the course of the post-Watergate revelations, the Soviet provocations on its border with China were accompanied with missile-rattling such that the US was led to warn the Soviet Union against any attempt at a 'first strike' against Chinese nuclear installations. 1971 saw the Soviet Union collide with India to break up Pakistan, while President Sadat's sudden expulsion of 17,000 Soviet 'technicians' in July 1972 gives some indication of how the Soviet Union sought to control Egyptian state policy through this military 'aid'. The period leading up to the Helsinki Conference was freer of the more spectacular signs of Soviet military intervention abroad, but no sooner was lasting peace and 'détente' proclaimed in Helsinki than the Soviet Union fomented civil war in Angola and sent in its 'advisers', plus several thousand regular Cuban forces under its command. On the opposite side of Africa, the Soviet Union has spent large sums to buy itself into the Somali government's favour and set up a military base overlooking the tanker routes from the Middle East to Europe. It is quite impossible to deny, in 1976, that the Soviet Union is bent on a course of imperial expansion, and in particular, bent on stepping into the shoes of the USA in many parts of the world, as the grip of US imperialism weakens under the impact of its crushing defeat in Indo-China and the contradictions that this has opened up for it at home.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Of course the Soviet Union supports several genuine anti-imperialist movements, in various parts of the world. But we should be careful of taking anti-imperialist rhetoric at face value, as this all too frequently comes from the most dubious quarters. It is part of the stock-in-trade of all

ascendant imperialisms, particularly those with a somewhat updated and more 'modern' principle of organization, to give aid and succour to movements against their older-established and decaying rivals, and use this to turn such movements into their own client regimes. The classical exponent of this form of 'anti-imperialism' used to be the USA, from its 'liberation' of Cuba and the Philippines from Spain in the 1890s, to its support for decolonization movements against the British and French in Africa in the 1950s.

Soviet 'anti-imperialism', just like its American predecessor, must be judged not by its own rhetoric, but by its real outcome. And this can easily be seen to depend on whether the recipients of Soviet support maintain their basic independence, or put themselves in pawn to their Soviet helpers. In the case of Vietnam, we have a country that has remained in control of its own destiny, despite accepting substantial support from the Soviet Union in its struggle against US imperialism. Having fought so long and heroic a people's war, the Vietnamese can insist that the Soviet Union respect their independence, and progress on to an all-round development of their economy and society. The case of Cuba, on the other hand, where the regime has become dependent on Soviet support for its continued existence, is altogether more questionable. Economically, Cuban production is oriented toward supplying the needs of the Soviet Union, particularly in sugar, while since 1970 Cuba has given up all pretence of an independent foreign policy, and as can be seen in the case of the Angolan expedition, even its armed forces are directly controlled from Moscow.

WHAT TYPE OF WAR?

World war, which is distinctive of the imperialist era and endemic to it, erupts consequent on the uneven development of the imperialist 'great powers'. It is a struggle for the redivision of an already divided world, and thus goes hand in hand with intensified aggression by the 'great powers' against smaller and weaker countries. The two World Wars that we have already seen this century have combined these two aspects in slightly different ways. In the First World War, the strategic contention between Britain and Germany (Germany seeking to equal and surpass Britain in the arms race) was so intense that a relatively minor crisis in Europe was able to spark off all-out war between the two greatest powers and their respective allies. In the Second World War, the ascendant imperialist bloc of the 'Axis' pursued a policy of annexation and nibbled away at the British and American spheres of influence for a while (Abyssinia, Austria, China, Czechoslovakia, etc.) before finally forcing the Western powers to resist. (The USA not until the bombing of Pearl Harbour.)

In the inter-imperialist contention of today, just like that leading up to the First and Second World Wars, one side is on the rise, the other seeks to preserve a favourable status quo. In all three cases it has been

the Western capitalist bloc that has been on the defensive, originally with Britain in its lead, then after 1945 the USA. (Today, the two superpowers are in a class completely of their own in their world role; all other imperialism is of a partial and local character.) The 'challengers' to Western hegemony, from Imperial Germany onwards, have had to evolve certain particular characteristics. In attempting to wrest dominance of the imperialist world from the established powers, they have needed a higher degree of state planning in their economies (Lenin already analysed the 'state monopoly capitalism' of war-time Germany in 1917), a more repressive and militarized internal regime ('Prussianism' in Wilhelmine Germany, then the full-blown fascism of the Axis powers), and a more dynamic and crusading ideology (such as fascism also provided). The Soviet Union today similarly possesses these characteristics that are needed to challenge US imperialism for world hegemony. And in 1976 it is clear that US strategy has now been forced decisively back onto the defensive, following its crushing defeat in Indochina and the domestic contradictions this has awakened.

It is not inconceivable that a diplomatic incident like the Cuban crisis of 1962 could still trigger off a full-scale nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. But this form of hostilities is increasingly unlikely. For the offensive power, the Soviet Union, it risks serious injury to its own territory without even attempting to extend its sphere of influence; for the defensive power, the USA, it risks similar injury without actually defending its sphere of influence. The 'collusion' aspect of Soviet-US relations, and the constant diplomatic dialogue between them to guard against 'misunderstandings' on either side, is completely rational from both parties' points of view. This is the real meaning of 'détente'.

War is never simply an all-out struggle between two combatants. It always has its 'language' and conventions, and it is perfectly possible for the two superpowers to refrain from using nuclear weapons in a war between them, just as neither side in the Second World War used poison gas. It is significant here that while the SALT talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons have made a certain degree of progress, the MBFR talks on 'mutual and balanced force reduction' in Europe have not done so at all. The destructive power of strategic nuclear weapons does at least tend to deter either side from using them, but it no way deters a war fought with conventional weapons, possibly with tactical nuclear support, and not on the superpowers' home territories.

In seeking to expand its sphere of influence and wrest territory from the USA, the Soviet Union is most likely to continue on its present course—fishing in troubled waters, supporting anti-imperialist struggles against its rival with a view to exploiting these for its own ends, pressing on every door until it finds one open, in short, making use of contradictions outside its own boundaries, both international and intranational, to push gradually outwards. This is more like the chain of events that led up to the Second World War than that leading up to the First, though there are of course still significant differences. The Nazi regime in Germany, coming freshly to power in 1933 on a wave of

nationalist expansionism, launched impetuously on a crusade undertaken explicitly under the flag of conquest, and with little heed even of rational calculation (viz. the conflicts between the Nazi leadership and the German general staff). The Soviet regime, however, while it has distorted the ideas of Marxism-Leninism to justify its own expansionist drive, is the outcome of a fairly long process of gradual development, with no sentimental mass movement to cater to, and an ideology that must make at least a show of universalism. Soviet expansion is accordingly more patient than that of Nazi Germany, less bent on spectacular short-term results, and must try to link up where it can with forces present within the countries annexed. This is particularly necessary at a time when the peoples of the Third World are politically awakened, and popular struggles for national liberation have taken place right across the world. An ostensible Czechoslovak government, as more recently an ostensible government in Angola, 'requested' the Soviet Union to intervene. Yet Soviet expansion, for all its specific rhythm, ultimately forces the other superpower into a corner. Either the US reconciles itself to gradually abandoning its pretensions to world power in the face of Soviet advance, or it must make a stand and say 'no further'. War, like everything in human society, never has the mechanical predictability of certain natural events, but the tendency of imperialist rivalry in general, and the present contention between the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, is certainly a tendency towards a new world war.

BRITISH AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE

For the peoples of Western Europe, as already explained, the expansion of Soviet influence in their direction means the surrender of bourgeois democracy for a fascist-type regime, and the exchange of a mild imperialist yoke for a far more brutal one—much the same choice as Norway was faced with in 1940, between bourgeois democracy and relative independence in the British sphere of influence, or the Quisling puppet regime installed by Nazi Germany. The best defence against this, and it would free us from US influence as well, would be proletarian revolution and a 'United Socialist States of Europe'. But the class struggle in the bourgeois democracies in the present historical era is fixed more or less firmly on a gradualist course. For better or worse, we have to meet the threat of Soviet expansion 'this side' of any prospective proletarian revolution.

This still poses more than one alternative for the working class. There are those who say that in the era of imperialism, the working classes of all countries should combat war by a policy of 'revolutionary defeatism'. This view is based on Lenin's tactic during the First World War, but it ignores the differences between that situation and the present one. In 1914, Lenin called on the European workers to 'turn the imperialist war into a civil war', by turning their arms against their respective govern-

ments, irrespective of whether this would involve the defeat of their state by the other side. But then the workers' movement was overwhelmingly located in the warring imperialist *great powers* of the time: Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and even a smaller state such as 'gallant little Belgium' was fighting to preserve its colonial empire. Today, there are only two great powers: the USA and the Soviet Union. For the West European countries, the war that they have to prepare for is simply a war of national defence, against Soviet expansionism. There can be no question of West European armies, which would be hard pressed to defend their own countries, going out to annex the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or anywhere else.

But even if we reject 'revolutionary defeatism', there is still the question whether the working class should support military preparations by the existing bourgeois state. Is this not strengthening a force that can later be used against the working class? Those who deem it viable to work for the violent overthrow of the bourgeois state, in Britain or one of the other West European countries, may be prepared, for the sake of this perspective, to run the risk of foreign occupation and the installation of a fascist puppet regime. However we believe that the experience that the West European working classes have historically acquired of the contrast between bourgeois democracy and fascism, and between national independence and foreign rule, will make it impossible for such a tactic to win any mass support. The only viable socialist strategy in Britain, and we believe in most other West European countries as well, is one that involves the working class facing the threat of Soviet aggression in the context of the existing political system. Certainly, the working class should struggle to advance its own interests within the national united front. And as we indicate below, the requirements of national defence compel democratic reforms of the army and state, thus making it more difficult for the bourgeoisie to use these apparatuses against the working class.

The other question that has to be decided, for both the working class and the bourgeoisie in Western Europe, is the relationship with the USA. Even on the part of the bourgeoisie, there are substantial signs of restlessness at the 'superpower condominium' of the USA and USSR, as it was labelled by Michel Jobert, the former French Foreign Minister—wrongly stressing the collusion aspect of the superpower relationship rather than the dominant aspect of contention. And in Britain, the wing of the bourgeoisie represented by Edward Heath and the 'progressive Conservatives' have sought in the strengthening of the EEC the means of pursuing a more independent European foreign policy. On the working-class side, it has not just been those beguiled by the Soviet Union who have sought to extricate themselves from NATO. The big 'unilateralist' campaign of fifteen years ago was motivated above all by the belief that Britain would be more secure, in the event of war, independent of either power bloc, and this sentiment still lingers on among the Labour left.

The interest of the working class requires independence from both

superpowers, through the voluntary pooling of sovereignty by the West European countries on a basis of genuine equality. In Britain and Western Europe generally at the present time, it would be far better, from the working-class point of view, to be independent of the Atlantic Alliance, if this meant standing up to both superpowers on the basis of our own strength. But unfortunately this is not yet possible. The West European countries, as at present organised, are not in a position to defend themselves effectively. This is largely the result of too passive a reliance on the US 'nuclear umbrella' which NATO has itself helped to foster (particularly in Britain). But to break with NATO first, without having built up the means of independent defence, would be to leap out of the frying pan into the fire, particularly if this were attempted by each West European nation in isolation from the others.

If war should break out, then the West European nations and the United States would be fighting on the same side, if with different motives and aims (defence of national independence/defence of imperialist sphere of influence), just as were the Soviet Union and the USA in the Second World War. To refuse support from the USA would be ridiculous. But the interest of European independence requires that this support be taken without unacceptable strings attached to it, and this in turn means that the European nations must learn to rely primarily on their own defensive capacity. US support will then be a luxury that they can accept on their own terms to make the struggle a little easier, not a necessity that they cannot do without, and which the USA can therefore use to harness our countries to its own war chariot. If we work to build up our defence capacity then we can dispense with reliance on the USA; and this means major changes in the structure and operation of the Atlantic Alliance. But to break with the Alliance altogether at this time, above all to break with it individually, would be suicidal, and simply invite the Soviet Union to divide the European nations against each other and pick them off one by one.

NATIONAL DEFENCE AND CLASS STRUGGLE

If, as seems more than likely, the threat of Soviet expansionism continues to grow, and to come nearer our own shores (we have already seen in 1975 the 'buzzing' of North Sea oil rigs, Soviet naval exercises testing out a blockade of Western Europe, stepped-up activity by spy 'trawlers', etc.), then the class contradiction in Britain will give way, as it did in 1939-40, to the national contradiction in the main contradiction involving the British working class. But this in no way means abandoning the class struggle. National defence and class privilege are always antipodes to one another. In a war of resistance against foreign invasion, the military effort always depends on the people of the country and their will to resist. Those in positions of privilege and authority are therefore faced with a clear choice: to make the concessions to the people that are necessary to inspire them to fight the aggres-

sors, or to put their class privilege first and capitulate to the invader—either openly, or by only making a half-hearted resistance.

In some circumstances, sections of the European bourgeoisies have displayed conspicuous capitulationist tendencies towards imperialism: in France in 1870, and again in 1940. But in Britain, the threat of Nazi invasion did not entice any significant section of the bourgeoisie to capitulate to the aggressors for the sake of preserving their privileges over the working class. In the context of a national united front, the British working class was able to make important advances. The armed forces saw a real measure of democratization, and the commissioning of officers from working-class origin. Steeply progressive taxation cut into the wealth of the rich. The 1944 Education Act was passed. Even the National Health Service, which stands out as the biggest achievement of the 1945 Labour government, was already planned under the war-time Coalition.

Today, it is even less likely than in 1940 that any significant section of the British bourgeoisie would take up a capitulationist position. Soviet imperialism has certainly no more to commend it to the Western bourgeoisies than Nazi imperialism did, these bourgeoisies have less to defend against their working classes, and in addition to this the Soviet Union still seeks to play the 'proletarian' card in its efforts to undermine Western Europe. Unfortunately, there are still elements in the British workers' movement that can be taken in by this. Indeed, a capitulationist tendency is rather more likely to show itself from these sections of the trade-union and labour bureaucracies, who just might seek a cosy niche for themselves in a Soviet-style state capitalism. This is particularly important for the working class to guard against, as it could lead to a dangerous demoralization. We don't want to have to learn the brutal truth about Soviet rule the hard way; the more the working class is forewarned, the better position it is in to press its own interests, where these conflict with those of the bourgeoisie, within the common struggle of the national united front.

CONCRETE POLICIES OF PREPARATION

We can be confident that, if the crunch comes, the vast majority of British people will unite and rally to the task of national defence. But at present, when the danger is still only on the horizon, two kinds of confusion still persist that make it difficult to begin preparing for this contingency in good time. The first of these has already been mentioned, i.e. the illusion that NATO membership and the collusion aspect of the superpower relationship (détente) itself creates: war is seen as 'inevitable'; if war did break out, the Americans would protect us; at least, there would be nothing we could do about it, just a nuclear cataclysm.

In fact, there is a great deal that can be done to defend Britain against invasion—and this is the concrete form in which war would

present itself, not a mythical nuclear Armageddon:

- 1) The reintroduction of national service, and its extension to women as well, would be a major step towards independent national defence; it would of course require further democratic reforms in the armed forces to make it politically acceptable.
- 2) The mass provision of shelters against aerial attack, even though this can never provide full security, would greatly reduce the temptation to submit to nuclear blackmail. The example of China, and nearer home that of Sweden, shows that civil defence of this kind is a real possibility—and therefore an absolute necessity.

- 3) To resist naval blockade, it is highly desirable that Britain should be more self-sufficient in agriculture, also that domestic and land-based sources of energy should be extended (Selby coalfield, wind and solar power, etc.).

These points are in no way intended to be comprehensive; they simply strike us as the most glaring needs.

The more prepared a country is to meet potential invasion, the less likely that such invasion actually takes place. And the fundamental factor on which all others depend is the political will of the people. The British people showed this in no uncertain terms in 1940; but the lesson we should draw from that experience is that things would have been very much easier had a small part of the 'Dunkirk spirit' been shown somewhat earlier in the day. It is here that the other kind of confusion presents itself. In the British labour movement, there is still too great a tendency to see the Soviet Union through the eyes of the past, and not understand its present reality. This is of course played on by the actual stooges of Soviet imperialism; although a tiny minority, even in the CPGB, they can thus exert a disproportionate influence. On the side of the bourgeoisie, there are still those who pretend to view the Soviet threat and the struggle of the British working class as two sides of the same coin, pinning the tag of treason on the just struggles of the workers' movement to conceal their own greedy defence of their class privilege.

These tendencies on either side of the class division reinforce and perpetuate each other in a dangerous way. The militant workers hear their struggles ascribed to Soviet manipulation, and conclude that there must be something good about the Soviet Union. The bourgeoisie hear the sympathy expressed for the Soviet Union in the workers' movement, and conclude that the workers' leaders are in Moscow's pocket. It will not be easy to clear this political obstacle before it is burst apart by the very imminence of a direct threat of aggression. But on our side, at least, the side of the working class, those who are already aware that the Soviet Union is against us, and not for us, need to start clearing up the confusion and call Soviet imperialism by its true name. If the working-class cause is to advance, a correct understanding of all the forces at work in the world is needed, not just those in Britain; and those at work today, not twenty years in the past. The history of imperialism has already proved this, and we ignore it at our peril.

Second World Defence

1. SECOND WORLD DEFENCE is an ad hoc group not affiliated to any political party.
2. The Second World consists of those small and medium-sized developed capitalist countries that are not imperialist 'great powers'. Although they still benefit from the imperialist economic system, the Second World countries are themselves, like the Third World, the object of economic and political annexation by the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, who form the First World.
3. Of the two superpowers, it is the Soviet Union that is today in its phase of expansion, and thus the main source of a new world war. In Europe in particular, Soviet expansionism is the main threat to peace and social progress.
4. The interest of Britain as a Second World country, and especially the interest of the working class, requires a foreign policy of self-reliance, European unity, and cooperation with the Third World countries, so as to stand up to both superpowers from a position of independence.
5. SECOND WORLD DEFENCE seeks to play a modest part in preparing public opinion in Britain, and working-class opinion in particular, to face the problem of superpower contention, Soviet expansion and the impending danger of war.

This pamphlet is planned as the first of a series. We would therefore be particularly glad of your comments and criticism. Our address is:

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Further copies can be ordered from this address: please send 20p, plus 8p p + p (post free on orders of 6 or more).